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PROPOSED REFORMS TO TEXAS JUDICIAL SELECTION: 
PANELIST REMARKS 
BRIAN T. FITZPATRICK* 
I am going to set the stage by providing a little background 
about the various methods that States around the country use to 
select their judges. I am also going to remind us of many of the 
considerations that we like to think about when we are deciding 
which of these methods is best. And I am going to push upon you 
a new consideration that is sometimes not thought about in these 
discussions as well as share some data regarding this last 
consideration. But let’s start with some background about the 
selection methods. 
There are basically four different ways that States select their 
judges around the country.1 The original method in all of the 
States was political appointment.2 Almost all the States did the 
same thing the federal government did from the beginning. And 
while some of them did not have life tenure, all the States relied 
either on the legislature, the executive, or both to pick their 
judges.3 A handful of States still follow the political appointment 
method today.4 
In the early 1800s, States began to switch to partisan elections 
and away from political appointment; by the time of the civil war, 
the vast majority of States were using partisan elections to pick 
their judges.5 And today there are still quite a few States that use 
partisan elections to pick their judges.6 In the progressive era, 
after deciding that politics was a bad thing, States developed the 
idea of nonpartisan elections for judges—taking party 
identification off the ballot.7 And a number of States today are 
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2. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The Constitutionality of Federal Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation and 
the History of State Judicial Selection and Tenure, 98 VA. L. REV. 839, 856 (2012). 
3. Id.  
4. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The Case for Political Appointment of Judges, THE FEDERALIST 
SOCIETY, Apr. 2018, at 6 (highlighting that only four states select judges for their highest 
courts with political appointments).   
5. Fitzpatrick, supra note 2, at 859-60. 
6. Id.  
7. Id. 
FITZPATRICK (DO NOT DELETE) 6/5/2020  3:52 PM 
308 Texas Review of Law & Politics Vol. 24 
using non-partisan elections.8 It is close to the most popular 
method today. 
The only method that may be more popular today is the 
commission method—the method that came about last in our 
history.9 Sometimes it’s called “merit selection.” Other times it is 
called the Missouri Plan because Missouri was the first state to 
adopt the plan in 1940.10 This method basically asks a 
commission to decide who is worthy to be placed on the bench.11 
In practice, the commission will send a small number of names, 
usually around three, to the governor, and the governor will pick 
one of those names.12 The chosen candidate will then stay on the 
bench until the term is up.13 Once the term is up, most of these 
States will then use something called the retention election to 
decide whether to retain the judge.14 It is an election with no 
opponent.  Rather, voters are asked yes or no: Do you want to 
retain the judge? 
Today, this commission-based system is used for high-court 
judges in almost half of the States.15 It is the most popular method 
implemented, followed by non-partisan elections, partisan 
elections, and then political appointment. These are the four 
methods that are still used around the country today. 
In my experience, when considering which of these methods 
should be adopted, people weigh various factors in their minds.  
We want independent judges.16 We also want our judges to feel 
somewhat accountable to the people or the political process for the 
decisions they make; this restricts the judges from doing whatever 
they want to. We of course want competent judges—people who 
understand the law and write well. Furthermore, a lot of people 
want racial, ethnic, and gender diversity on the courts.17 Of course 
people want honest judges—individuals of integrity. And we want 
the judges to work in a system that people see as legitimate.18 These 
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14. Id.  
15. Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 1729–30. 
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17. Malia Reddick, Michael J. Nelson, and Rachel Paine Caufield, Racial and Gender 
Diversity on State Courts-An AJS Study, JUDGES’ J., at 28.  
18. Tom R. Tyler and Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment of Discretionary 
Legal Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 43 DUKE L.J. 705, 712–13 
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are the typical factors that people seek out for people that 
comprise our judicial system. 
But there is another factor that is not often considered in these 
discussions, but one that should be widely discussed. This factor 
can be described as ideological skew: Are the courts filled with 
judges with very different ideological views, very different values, 
very different worldviews from the people who live in their States? 
Now, someone may think to themselves, well, who cares if our 
judges have different ideological views? Different ideological 
views are not supposed to matter; a judge is supposed to follow 
the law. 
But there is a vast amount of empirical evidence suggesting that 
a judge’s policy-views, world-views, and values make a difference 
to how the judge decides a case.19 Not in every case, but in a lot of 
cases. How a judge sees the law is often driven, especially when the 
law is ambiguous, by a priori ideological views. And so if a State’s 
judicial system is comprised of judges with very different views 
than the people in their States, a State will have legal 
interpretations that are very different than what the people want 
them to be. 
Now, why should a State be concerned about this ideological 
skew? Well, a graph of the ideological views of the legal 
profession in the United States of America demonstrates why 
states should be concerned. This graph comes from a paper by 
Adam Bonica and Maya Sen.20  In Figure 1 here, each bar on the 
graph represents a certain number of lawyers. The liberal lawyers 
are on the left side of the graph, and the conservative lawyers are 
on the right side. And the little dotted line there is your average 








(1994); see generally Kathy Mack and Sharyn Roach Anleu, Performing Impartiality: Judicial 
Demeanor and Legitimacy, 35 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY 137, 138–39  (2010).  
19. Fitzpatrick, supra note 10 at 687-88.  
20. Bonica et al., The Political Ideologies of American Lawyers, 8 J. of Legal Analysis 277 
(2016). 
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Figure 1 
So what does this mean? Well, it means a couple things. 
Number one, if you have a selection method that relies on the 
legal profession to pick judges, there will be a good chance that 
the legal profession is going to pick judges with an ideological 
distribution very similar to the dotted line—i.e., left leaning. 
And of the four methods previously discussed, the commission 
method, tends to place a lot of power to pick judges in the hands 
of the legal profession. Why? Well, it is because the 
commissioners on the commission are often picked by the state 
bar.21 In some states, the state bar leadership will appoint 
individuals to those commissions.22 In other states, the lawyers in 
the state will vote for who should be on the commissions.23 But 
when a majority of the commissioners are selected by the state 
bar, a lot of power is handed to the legal profession. Thus, there 
is concern that the commissions might select judges who are 
ideologically similar to them instead of ideologically similar to the 
people of the states.24 
 
21. Fitzpatrick, supra note 10, at 679.  
22. Id.  
23. Id.  
24. Id. at 689-90 
Source: Bonica et al. (2016)
Ideological Distribution of Lawyers
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But even without the commission, because the pool of judges 
will be drawn from the pool of lawyers, if states do not pay 
attention to ideological preferences, the chances are that a 
randomly picked judge out of the pool of lawyers will tend to be 
more representative of lawyers rather than the people of the 
State. Thus, if States do not screen the worldview of the potential 
judges, a State will replicate the current distribution of the 
lawyers. And this is not merely a theory anymore: I’ve spent 
several years trying to prove that selection methods that do not 
screen for ideology produce judges that are to the left of the 
people in their States. 
In particular, I have collected campaign contribution data for 
all of the people who have served as appellate judges in each state 
between 1990 and 2010—a total of more than 3000 different 
appellate judges. I looked to see whether those appellate judges 
donated more money to Democrats or Republicans over the 
course of their lives—regardless of whether it was before they were 
on the bench or after they were on the bench. And then I 
compared the distribution of the political preferences of the 
judges in each state to the people in that state. Were the people 
voting more for Democrats or more for Republicans in state races 
and federal races? 
My results are in Figure 2.  The middle line on this chart—the 
0% line—reflects when judges and the people are the same, the 
same distribution of Democrats and Republicans. Bars to the left 
are states where the judges are more liberal than the people. Bars 
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Figure 2 
A couple of things to note. First of all, in the vast majority of 
states, the judges are more left leaning than the people. And 
again, it’s not surprising because lawyers are left-leaning. And if 
we don’t pay attention to that, we end up with judges who are left 
leaning. Very few states have judges who are right leaning, but I 
will tell you one of those states is Texas. On the graph, the third 
state from the bottom is Texas, and is one of the very few states 
where the judges have been more conservative than the people. 
We can also group this data by selection method rather than 
by state.  I do that in Figure 3.  Here, we can test whether 
selection methods that either rely on the legal profession to pick 
judges or on non-partisan elections with no ideological 
screening produce a left leaning skew. Figure 3 confirms the 
presence of a skew.  The top bar is the commission method; the 
second bar non-partisan elections; the third bar is partisan 
elections; and  the fourth bar is political appointment. As 
discussed, the 0% line depicts judges perfectly aligned with the 
public’s ideological views. According to the graph, the Missouri 
Plan and non-partisan elections have the biggest skew—and a 
leftward skew—away from the public. The system that is the 
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closest to the public is political appointment. Partisan elections 
fall in between the two extremes. 
Figure 3 
It should be noted that I did not test any of this data for 
statistical significance. But Adam Bonica and Maya Sen have tested 
similar data and they found the differences between selection 
methods to be statistically significant.25  In my view, we therefore 
ignore this data at our own peril. 
 
 
25. See generally Adam Bonica and Maya Sen, The Politics of Selecting the Bench from the 
Bar: The Legal Profession and Partisan Incentives to Introduce Ideology Into Judicial Selection, 60 
J.L. & ECON. 559 (2017).  
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